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Federal Court Adjudication of State Prisoner Claims for
Post-Conviction DNA Testing: A Bifurcated Approach
DYLAN RUGA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly, there are innocent people in prison. Moreover, it is
probable that the wrongly convicted, if given a chance to conduct DNA
testing on evidence used against them at trial, could establish their innocence.
Many federal courts recently have denied prisoners’ requests for postconviction DNA testing because the courts have reasoned that the prisoners
are seeking release from confinement. This ignores the fact that prisoners
who seek to prove their innocence through DNA testing necessarily must
embark upon a two-step process, which courts should bifurcate and consider separately. The first step, which I call the “procurement phase,” occurs when the initial request is made by a prisoner to secure any biological
evidence within the state’s control. If the prisoner’s request is denied, a
claim is filed against the state prosecutor or sheriff for violating the prisoner’s due process right to the evidence, and thus it is properly brought
under § 1983.1 During this phase, the prisoner is not seeking release from
confinement; rather, he merely is seeking injunctive relief to obtain and
conduct DNA testing on evidence that is within the state’s control.
The second step, or the “exoneration phase,” occurs after the results of
the DNA testing exclude the prisoner’s DNA from the crime scene. During this phase, the prisoner seeks to use the test results to demonstrate his
actual innocence and be released from confinement. While there is some
* J.D. candidate, UCLA School of Law, 2004; B.A., Oberlin College, 2000. Special thanks to
Professor Gary Rowe for his guidance in the development of this article. I also am indebted to Jeremy
Fogel and Thomas Rowe for their invaluable feedback and assistance in editing. Thanks also to
Eugene Volokh for taking the time to provide insight into the publication process. Finally, I would like
to thank the staff of the Pierce Law Review for their hard work and time spent on this article.
1. Typically, prisoners will initially seek access to the evidence by asking the prosecutor who tried
the case. If the prosecutor refuses to supply the evidence, the prisoner will file a § 1983 action and
allege that the prosecutor, acting under color of state law, deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment
right to Due Process. See Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2002), pet. for rehearing and
rehearing en banc denied, 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002); Boyle v. Mayer, 2002 WL 31085186 (6th Cir.
Sept. 17, 2002) at *1. For a discussion as to why a prisoner properly claims a due process violation,
see infra Part III-C.
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debate as to the proper federal remedy for claims of actual innocence,2
requests made during the exoneration phase are properly brought as habeas
petitions.3
The Fourth,4 Fifth,5 Sixth,6 and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals7
have all recently reviewed district court adjudications of prisoners’ § 1983
actions to obtain DNA testing. In each case, the prisoner was in the procurement phase and was not seeking release from prison. The Eleventh
Circuit stood alone in granting the prisoner’s request; the others, citing the
Supreme Court decisions Heck v. Humphrey8 and Preiser v. Rodriguez,9
denied relief because they reasoned that the prisoners, in reality, were attempting to assert claims of actual innocence, which are properly brought
as habeas petitions.10
Legislation currently is pending in both the Senate11 and the House of
Representatives12 that creates a uniform procedure for adjudicating claims
for post-conviction DNA testing. The legislation is unclear, however,
about whether state prisoners may continue to file § 1983 actions directly
in federal court to obtain such testing. This ambiguity, unless revised before enacted, will lead to inconsistent judicial interpretation and further
confuse the already unpredictable handling of requests for genetic testing.
Part II of this Comment will examine the reasoning behind recent circuit court decisions concerning prisoners’ rights to post-conviction genetic
testing. I will explain that a bifurcated approach is the appropriate paradigm for reviewing these claims and demonstrate why three of the four
circuit courts erred in their analyses. This part also will review the Supreme Court decisions cited by the circuit courts and explain why the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits’ reliance on those decisions was misplaced.
2. See infra Part III(2)(A).
3. A writ of habeas is the traditional manner by which a prisoner is able to have his conviction
dismissed. See Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 202 (1830) (explaining that the purpose of a writ of
habeas corpus is the “liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause” and to
“examine the legality of the commitment”). For a history of habeas corpus in the United States, see
Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 785-89 (2d ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1994).
4. Harvey, 278 F.3d 370.
5. Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002).
6. Boyle, 2002 WL 31085186.
7. Bradley v. Pyror, 305 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2002).
8. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
9. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
10. See Harvey, 278 F.3d at 375-78 (relying on Heck and Preiser to reject plaintiff’s claim);
Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 340-41 (same); Boyle, 2002 WL 31085186 at *1 (same).
11. Advancing Justice through DNA Technology Act of 2003, 2003 S. 1700, 108th Cong. (Oct. 1,
2003) (as introduced).
12. Advancing Justice through DNA Technology Act of 2003, 2003 H.R. 3214, 108th Cong. (Nov.
6, 2003) (received by Senate).
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Part III will address how the Supreme Court should reconcile the current circuit split concerning the rights of prisoners to post-conviction DNA
testing. This part confronts skeptics’ concerns of protecting finality, respecting federalism, and flooding the courts with prisoner suits. It concludes that neither the abstention doctrines nor the Prison Litigation Reform Act preclude federal court review of these claims and that a due process right to genetic testing should be recognized. Lastly, I will explain that
the sole remedy currently available for prisoners with favorable DNA test
results is executive clemency and I will argue why clemency is an insufficient solution.
Finally, Part IV will analyze briefly the pending congressional legislation and explain that its language, as written, leaves doubt as to whether
Congress intends to preclude § 1983 actions to prisoners seeking DNA
testing. This ambiguity, unless corrected, will further exacerbate federal
courts’ confusion regarding the proper analysis of such claims.
II. RECENT CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
A. Squeezing a Square Peg into a Round Hole: The Problem with Relying
on Precedent to Analyze Requests for Genetic Testing
The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals all recently
have erred in their analysis of § 1983 claims brought by prisoners seeking
to obtain DNA testing. In each case, the prisoner’s action was in the procurement phase. The courts, however, concerned with disrupting the finality of convictions and opening the floodgates to state prisoners, erroneously relied on Heck v. Humphrey and Preiser v. Rodriguez, and ultimately
denied the prisoners’ claims as if they were in the exoneration phase. This
mistaken reliance was a result of the courts’ utilization of a singular, rather
than a bifurcated, analysis.
Heck v. Humphrey was a § 1983 action seeking damages from two
prosecutors and an investigator for alleged misconduct during the investigation and trial that led to the plaintiff’s confinement.13 The Supreme
Court dismissed the claim, holding that:
when a state prisoner seeks damages in a §1983 suit, the district
court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
13. Heck’s complaint alleged that “respondents, acting under color of state law, had engaged in an
‘unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation’ leading to [his] arrest; ‘knowingly destroyed’
evidence ‘which was exculpatory in nature and could have proved [his] innocence’; and caused ‘an
illegal and unlawful voice identification procedure’ to be used at [his] trial.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 479.
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would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed . . . . But if the
district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal
judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.14
The “whole point” of Heck was to protect the finality of state convictions.15
In Harvey v. Horan, the Fourth Circuit, concerned that providing postconviction genetic testing would offend Heck by disrupting the finality of
convictions, relied on Heck to deny the plaintiff’s request for DNA testing.16 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, although the petitioner in Heck
sought damages, “the [Supreme] Court did not limit its holding to such
claims[] [a]nd we see no reason why its rationale would not apply in a
situation where a criminal defendant seeks injunctive relief that necessarily
implies the invalidity of his conviction.”17 Simply stated, the Fourth Circuit’s holding reflects its belief that “finality cannot be sacrificed to every
change in technology.”18 The Fifth and Sixth Circuit courts, in terse decisions devoid of explicit reasoning, followed the lead of the Fourth Circuit
and similarly cited Heck to dismiss claims for post-conviction DNA testing.19
In addition to concerns about disrupting finality, these courts were
concerned that recognizing the prisoners’ claims under § 1983 would offend federalism and federal-state comity. To avoid this problem, the courts
relied on Preiser and held that the prisoners’ proper remedy is a habeas
petition. In Preiser, the Supreme Court denied the respondents’ § 1983
claim for injunctive relief to re-obtain good-time credits that were forfeited
because of disciplinary action.20 The Court held that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment,
and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate
release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal rem14. Id. at 487 (first and second emphasis added, final emphasis in original).
15. Harvey, 278 F.3d at 375 n.1.
16. Id. at 375. Although Harvey was denied relief in the federal courts, the state courts and legislatures eventually granted his request. Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 304 (2002) (denying rehearing en
banc).
17. Harvey, 278 F.3d at 375.
18. Id. at 376.
19. Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 340-41 (“We agree with the analysis of the Fourth Circuit, which recently
held, under Heck, that no § 1983 claim exists for injunctive relief to compel DNA testing under materially indistinguishable circumstances.”); Boyle, 2002 WL 31085186 at *1.
20. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.
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edy is a writ of habeas corpus.”21 The Court reasoned that due to states’
strong interest in the administration of their prisons, in order to protect
federal-state comity, a prisoner challenging his confinement first should be
required to exhaust available state remedies.22
The circuit courts, equally concerned with protecting federal-state
comity, all reasoned that Preiser controlled in the prisoners’ § 1983 actions
for genetic testing and held that the proper remedy is a habeas petition.
The Fourth Circuit justified its conclusion by explaining that the plaintiff
essentially was attempting to gain access to the evidence in order to “set
the stage for a future attack on his confinement.”23 The Fifth Circuit,
reaching the same conclusion, reasoned that a prisoner’s request for DNA
testing is “so intertwined” with the merits of his conviction that any such
claim must be treated as a habeas petition.24 The Sixth Circuit followed
the lead of its sister courts and found that the plaintiff was challenging “the
validity of his criminal convictions and the fact or duration of his continued confinement”25 and thus his exclusive federal remedy was a writ of
habeas corpus.26
In addition to offending federalism, the circuit courts expressed another, equally troubling, concern with allowing the plaintiffs’ claims to
proceed under § 1983 - doing so would open the floodgates to state prisoners seeking federal court review of their convictions.27 Without the restraints of a habeas petition, the argument goes, state prisoners will proceed directly into federal court to seek release from prison before even
attempting to exhaust state remedies. This is a slippery slope that eventually will overburden federal courts with frivolous claims filed by prisoners
who will use requests for genetic testing as yet another weapon in their
arsenal of challenges to their convictions.
While the concerns expressed by these courts must be taken seriously,
the error in the courts’ decisions is clear. Heck is not applicable in the procurement phase because granting a prisoner the right to conduct DNA testing on evidence does not “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his sentence.28 On the contrary, if the prisoner’s suit is successful, the only possible outcome is that he would obtain access to evidence in order to conduct
genetic testing. Although the test results may be favorable to the prisoner
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 491-92.
23. Harvey, 278 F.3d at 378.
24. See Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 341 (citing Martinez v. Tex. Ct. Crim. App., 292 F.3d 417, 423 (5th Cir.
2002)).
25. Boyle, 2002 WL 31085186 at *1.
26. Id.
27. See Harvey, 278 F.3d at 378.
28. Harvey, 285 F.3d at 308 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc).
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and enable him to challenge his conviction in the exoneration phase,
merely obtaining access to the evidence does not in any way imply the
invalidity of his sentence.
Similarly, Preiser is inapposite because the relief sought by a prisoner
in the procurement phase is an injunction to compel a state official to turn
over evidence, not a determination that he is entitled to an immediate or
speedier release from confinement. Since a ruling in the prisoner’s favor
would not affect the length of his sentence, Preiser is not controlling in the
procurement phase and should not be relied upon to deny prisoners’ claims
for access to the evidence.
Moreover, the policies advanced by Heck and Preiser - protecting finality and respecting federalism - are more appropriately addressed in the
exoneration phase, where prisoners actually are seeking release from
prison based on DNA test results. In the procurement phase, however, the
sole concern should be limiting those who qualify to bring claims for genetic testing in order to avoid a flood of claims brought by every prisoner
who will use such testing as a last-ditch effort to prove his innocence.
Therefore, while the concerns expressed by these circuit courts are certainly relevant to the question of whether prisoners ultimately should be
released based on genetic testing, the error in the courts’ reasoning is a
consequence of a singular - as opposed to bifurcated - approach to the
analysis.
B. Creating a Circuit Split: The Eleventh Circuit’s Analysis
Contrary to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit Court decisions, which
erroneously applied Heck and Preiser to preclude § 1983 claims made during the procurement phase, the Eleventh Circuit correctly permitted the
petitioner’s § 1983 action to stand in Bradley v. Pryor. In that case, Joe
Bradley filed a § 1983 action and sought the production of evidence used
against him at trial29 in order to conduct DNA testing.30
The Eleventh Circuit, which correctly adopted a bifurcated analysis,
granted Bradley’s claim. Specifically, the court distinguished Heck and
Preiser and reasoned that Bradley will have prevailed in his §1983 action
once he obtains access to the evidence or an accounting for its absence.31
The court further reasoned that granting Bradley’s claim does not “necessarily demonstrate[ ] or even impl[y] that his conviction is invalid.”32 The
29. Specifically, Bradley sought to conduct DNA testing on the rape kit and on the clothing worn by
the victim when her body was discovered. Bradley, 305 F.3d at 1288-89.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1290.
32. Id.
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court correctly realized that even if Bradley is able to demonstrate on the
basis of genetic testing that there is no match between his DNA and the
evidence used against him, he still would have to bring an entirely different
lawsuit to challenge his conviction and sentence based on those test results.33
Although the court distinguished prisoners’ claims for genetic testing
from the textual holdings of Heck and Preiser, it neither specifically addressed the policies advanced by those cases nor explained what should
happen if the DNA results are favorable to the plaintiff. Moreover, the
court neglected to address whether Bradley’s claim for DNA testing differs
from other prisoner’s claims, or what, if any, consequences will arise from
granting Bradley’s request. The following section of this comment confronts these issues and suggests an appropriate paradigm for subsequent
adjudication of suits for post-conviction genetic testing.
III. TIME TO ADAPT: HOW COURTS SHOULD HANDLE CLAIMS IN THE
FUTURE, ABSENT CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
Legislation currently is pending in both the Senate34 and the House of
Representatives35 to establish uniform guidelines for post-conviction DNA
testing in state and federal courts. In the absence of such legislation, however, the Supreme Court should resolve the current circuit split by adopting
an analysis that recognizes prisoners’ due process right to DNA testing.36
This bifurcated approach would acknowledge that a prisoner in the procurement phase is constitutionally entitled to conduct genetic testing on the
evidence, but would nevertheless place the burden on the prisoner to make
a persuasive showing of actual innocence in the exoneration phase.
The interests of protecting finality, respecting federalism, and avoiding
a flood of prisoner litigation are interests that underlie the decisions grappling with post-conviction genetic testing and these concerns must be considered before any viable solution can be presented. Numerous law review articles,37 state statutes,38 and even proposed federal legislative bills39
33. See id.
34. 2003 S. 1700, 108th Cong. (Oct. 1, 2003).
35. 2003 H.R. 3214, 108th Cong. (Nov. 6, 2003).
36. But see Harvey, 285 F.3d at 303 (suggesting that courts should not “constitutionalize this area;”
rather, they should wait for Congress to enact appropriate legislation).
37. See e.g. Jennifer Boemer, Student Author, Other Rising Legal Issues: In the Interest of Justice:
Granting Post-Conviction Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to Inmates, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev.
1971 (2001); Karen Christian, Student Author, “And the DNA Shall Set You Free”: Issues Surrounding
Postconviction DNA Evidence and the Pursuit of Innocence, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1195 (2001); David
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have attempted to address the question of whether prisoners should be entitled to post-conviction testing and, if so, whether they should be released if
the results are favorable to the prisoner. Each of these efforts, however,
envisions a singular approach to the analysis, and the vast majority of them
attempt to solve the problem by imposing various requirements intended to
limit actions at the procurement phase. In contrast, a bifurcated approach
allows the concerns of protecting finality, respecting federalism, and
avoiding a flood of litigation to be addressed in turn - the latter is the only
concern relevant in the procurement phase; protecting finality and respecting federalism, on the other hand, are apposite in the exoneration phase.
A. The Procurement Phase
As explained in Part II, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Preiser and
Heck are inapposite to a request to obtain and conduct genetic testing on
evidence because both of those cases involved prisoners who were trying
to challenge or shorten the length of their confinement - goals that are not
applicable in the procurement phase. The relevant concern in this phase is
that prisoners seeking post-conviction DNA testing will flood the courts.
Traditional doctrines created to avoid federal-court adjudication of claims,
such as the Prison Litigation Reform Act and federal court abstention, were
not intended to apply to prisoners seeking DNA testing and thus should not
be applied in these cases. Instead, courts should recognize prisoners’ due
process right to such testing and should make DNA evidence available to
every prisoner whose conviction would be undermined by exculpatory
results.

DeFoore, Student Author, Postconviction DNA Testing: A Cry for Justice From the Wrongly Convicted, 33 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 491 (2002); Holly Schaffter, Student Author, Postconviction DNA Evidence: A 500 Pound Gorilla in State Courts, 50 Drake L. Rev. 695 (2002); Kathy Swedlow, Don’t
Believe Everything you Read: A Review of Modern “Post-Conviction” DNA Testing Statutes, 38 Cal.
W. L. Rev. 355 (2002) .
38. See e.g. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4240 (West 2002); Cal. Penal Code § 1405 (West 2002); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4504 (2002); D.C. Code § 22-4133 (2003) and § 22-4135 (2003); Fla. Stat. §
925.11 (2002); Idaho Code § 19-4902 (2002); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/116-3 (2002); La. Crim. Proc.
Code Ann. art. 926.1 (2002); 15 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2138 (2002); Md. Crim Proc. Code Ann., § 8201 (2002); Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 547.035 (West 2002); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4120 (2002); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:84A-32a (2002); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30 (McKinney 2002); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A269 (2002); Or. Rev. Stat. § 138 (2002); 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 9543.1 (2002); Tenn. Code. Ann. §
40-30-303 (2003); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 64.03 (2002); Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-301 (2002);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.73.170 (West 2003); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 974.07 (West 2002). For a criticism of these legislative attempts, see Swedlow, supra n. 37.
39. Advancing Justice through DNA Technology Act of 2003, 2003 S. 1700, 108th Cong. (Oct. 1,
2003); Advancing Justice through DNA Technology Act of 2003, 2003 H.R. 3214, 108th Cong. (Nov.
6, 2003).
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1. The PLRA Does Not Apply to Claims in the Procurement Phase
42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows a claim to be brought against any person who,
under color of state law, has violated a federally protected right.40 Unlike
habeas corpus proceedings, there is no general requirement that a § 1983
claimant first exhaust available state remedies before filing suit in federal
court.41 In reaction to the large number of frivolous claims brought by
prisoners,42 however, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA),43 which establishes an exhaustion requirement specifically for
prisoners seeking relief in federal court.44 Applying the PLRA to prisoners
in the procurement phase is one way to limit the influx of claims for postconviction genetic testing; however, the PLRA, as written and interpreted
by the Supreme Court, is not applicable to these suits.
The PLRA precludes claims by prisoners “with respect to prison conditions” brought under § 1983 or any other federal law “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”45 Although the PLRA
does not define what is meant by “prison conditions,” the Supreme Court
recently had occasion to interpret the term in Porter v. Nussle.46 In that
case, Ronald Nussle alleged that a prison officer severely assaulted him in
violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual
punishments.47 Nussle brought his § 1983 claim directly to federal court,
bypassing the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.48 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Nussle’s claim was not controlled by the PLRA
because the exhaustion requirement “governs only conditions affecting
prisoners generally, not single incidents, such as corrections officers’ use
of excessive force, actions that immediately affect only particular prison-

40. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides federal court jurisdiction to hear claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Chemerinsky, supra n. 3, at 422.
41. Chemerinsky, supra n. 3, at 437; Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002); Patsy v. Bd. of
Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).
42. Senator Dole, in a statement to Congress, proclaimed that the PLRA was necessary because,
“[f]rivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners tie up the courts, waste valuable judicial and legal resources,
and affect the quality of justice enjoyed by the law-abiding citizens.” 141 Cong. Rec. S14413 (daily
ed. Sept. 25, 1995). The notion that frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners poses a problem to federal
courts has been challenged. See Anne H. Matthews, Student Author, The Inapplicability of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act to Prisoner Claims of Excessive Force, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 536, 549-51 (2002).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
45. Id.
46. 534 U.S. 516 (2002).
47. Id. at 519.
48. Id. at 519-20.

File: ruga[1].final(macro)moyermaier

44

Created on: 3/10/2004 2:27 PM

PIERCE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 4/2/2004 4:28 PM

Vol. 2, No. 1

ers.”49 The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning and
held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applied in Nussle’s case.50
After considering congressional intent and prior judicial precedent, the
Court ultimately held that “the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to
all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or
some other wrong.”51 Given the broad, sweeping language of the Court’s
holding, commentators and courts have understandably erred in their belief
that the PLRA now applies to all prisoner suits, regardless of their claims.52
The error stems from focusing on the latter portion of the holding
(“whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong”) and concluding that the Court intended to encompass every conceivable claim made by
a prisoner. Such a reading, however, overstates the Court’s holding and
leads to anomalous results.53
The proper interpretation of the Porter holding realizes that the latter
clause is limited by the former. In other words, the holding covers all possible claims made by a prisoner, but only to the extent that the claim is
about prison life. Thus, one can imagine numerous claims brought by
prisoners that are not about prison life and therefore are not subject to the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.54 A prisoner’s claim for access to evidence in the procurement phase is one such claim.
Moreover, a claim by a prisoner to obtain access to evidence in order
to conduct DNA testing is not one about “prison life” in the ordinary sense
of that term. Prisoners in the procurement phase are neither complaining
about the conditions of their confinement nor seeking redress for alleged
wrongdoing by corrections officers; rather, they are merely attempting to
49. Id. at 520.
50. Id. at 532.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. John Collins, Student Author, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Excessive Force as a Prison
Condition, 21 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 395, 396 (“The Supreme Court, reversing the Second Circuit,
held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits regardless of their claim.”).
See also Fatir v. Dowdy, 2002 WL 2018824 at *12 (D. Del., Sept. 4, 2002) (memorandum and order).
53. See Fatir, 2002 WL 2018824 at **11-12 (finding that, since the Supreme Court did not specifically exclude constitutional claims from those subject to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, plaintiff’s First Amendment constitutional claims must be exhausted even though they “do not appear to
assert claims for prison conditions”).
54. For example, a person may have a § 1983 cause of action against a police officer for an illegal
search and seizure that occurred before his incarceration. Because of the statute of limitations, the
claim would not have to be brought for a number of years. In the meantime, before the claim is filed,
the person is arrested and imprisoned for an unrelated crime. Once in prison, the person may bring the
§ 1983 action against the officer. See Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil §
1560, p. 446-47. This claim would not be about prison life and thus not subjected to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Under an interpretation that the Porter holding applies to all prisoner suits,
however, the person would be precluded from filing his claim directly in federal court without first
exhausting administrative remedies.
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compel state prosecutors and sheriffs to respect their due process right to
obtain exculpatory evidence.55 It follows that such claims are not addressed by the Supreme Court’s holding in Porter and thus are not subject
to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.
2. The Abstention Doctrines are Generally Inapplicable
The Supreme Court has determined that, in some instances, federal district courts must abstain from hearing cases that are otherwise justiciable,56
especially where abstention leads to “proper constitutional adjudication,
regard for federal-state relations, or wise judicial administration.”57 An
argument thus could be made that federal courts should abstain from hearing prisoners’ claims in the procurement phase where the convicting state
has enacted post-conviction DNA testing legislation because “wise judicial
administration” favors state-court adjudication of state prisoners’ postconviction claims. This argument is further supported by the well-settled
doctrine that a federal court has authority to decline to exercise jurisdiction
when “employ[ing] its historic powers as a court of equity.”58 Because
prisoners in the procurement phase are seeking an equitable remedy in the
form of injunctive relief, the argument continues, federal courts should use
their authority to abstain from hearing their claims.
Despite the intrinsic appeal of this argument, a general rule of federal
court abstention from hearing claims in the procurement phase would be
inappropriate for several reasons. First, it is clear that federal courts have
the authority to interpret state law.59 Second, federal courts regularly interpret state law when exercising supplemental jurisdiction and thus are
competent tribunals to adjudicate state prisoners’ § 1983 claims. Finally,
the Court has been reluctant to extend the abstention doctrines beyond several well-established circumstances,60 none of which generally are applicable in the procurement phase. 61
55. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 487 (1989) (“Defendant has a constitutional right to obtain . . .
exculpatory evidence.”); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). While the right to exculpatory evidence generally is relevant before trial, it is equally applicable after conviction where testing
may prove the defendant’s innocence. See Dabbs v. Vergari, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765, 768 (1990) (“[W]here
evidence has been preserved which has a high exculpatory potential, that evidence should be discoverable after conviction.”).
56. Chemerinsky, supra n. 3, at 685.
57. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. U. S., 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)) (internal quotations omitted).
58. Id. at 717 (quoting Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 120
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
59. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
60. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); R.R. Commn. of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496
(1941); La. Power and Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Colo. River Water Conservation
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3. Due Process & the Procurement Phase
In the seminal case of Brady v. Maryland,62 the Supreme Court held
that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process
where the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment.63 Evidence is
material under the Brady rule if “its suppression undermines confidence in
the outcome of the trial.”64 Although Brady was concerned with pre-trial
rights of an accused, the Court has long since recognized that prisoners
also are entitled to due process protections.65
Brady logically extends from the accused to the imprisoned because
suppressed DNA evidence necessarily undermines confidence in the outcome of a trial.66 The potentially exculpatory effect of DNA testing67 casts
doubt on the jury’s finding in any trial where such evidence was available
but not admitted.68 Indeed, where witnesses’ memories fail, testimony is
weighed subjectively by judges and juries, and sympathies are extended to
victims, DNA may be the only objective and inherently neutral evidence
that can affirmatively demonstrate a defendant’s innocence. Where such
evidence exists, it shocks the conscience to deny inmates access to it.69
Critics argue that defendants should not be constitutionally entitled to
conduct post-conviction DNA testing on evidence because the unavailability of DNA testing at the time of trial does not mean that their trial was
Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
61. Younger abstention applies where the federal court may interfere with ongoing state proceedings. Chemerinsky, supra n. 3, at 716. Pullman abstention is permitted when state law is unclear and a
state court’s clarification may make a federal court’s constitutional ruling unnecessary. Id. at 687.
Thibodaux abstention is relevant in a diversity case if “there is uncertain state law and an important
state interest that is ‘intimately involved’ with the government’s ‘sovereign prerogative.’” Id. at 701.
Colorado River abstention is relevant in limited circumstances where there is there is duplicative litigation in state and federal courts. Id. at 757-78. Brillhart abstention applies where a district court declines to hear a claim seeking declaratory judgment. Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts 715
(5th ed., West 1994). Burford abstention applies where the federal court defers to complex state administrative procedures. Chemerinsky, supra n. 3, at 702.
62. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
63. Id. at 87.
64. U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985).
65. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); see also Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist.
Attorney’s Off., 177 F.Supp.2d 366, 369 (2001); Dabbs 570 N.Y.S.2d at 767-68.
66. Godschalk, 177 F.Supp.2d at 370; Dabbs, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (“[W]here evidence has been
preserved which has high exculpatory potential, that evidence should be discoverable after conviction.”).
67. See Sen. 486, 107th Cong. at § 103(a)(1)(B); Cf. Natl. Commn. on the Future of DNA Evidence, Natl. Inst. of Just., U.S. Dept. of Just., Postconviction DNA Testing: Recommendations for
Handling Requests (1999) [hereinafter NIJ Report]; Schaffter, supra n. 37, at 699-702.
68. Godschalk, 177 F.Supp.2d at 370 (granting plaintiff’s request for DNA testing, even though he
had confessed to the crime, because, given the “well-known powerful exculpatory effect of DNA
testing,” confidence in the jury’s finding of guilt would be undermined).
69. Sen. 486, 107th Cong. at § 103(a)(1)(K).
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unfair.70 While it may be technically true that the wrongly convicted received a constitutionally “fair” trial, this argument callously disregards the
truth that conceptions of fairness and justice evolve with societal advancements. Relying on historical notions of fairness to preclude post-conviction
DNA testing damages the credibility of our justice system and validates the
constitutionally unacceptable act of punishing innocent persons.
Skeptics also contend that recognition of a post-conviction constitutional right to obtain DNA evidence in order to conduct testing will flood
the courts with claims and overburden the judiciary. Of course, this is
mere speculation, because it is uncertain how much genetic evidence has
been preserved from cases decided decades ago; it is even less certain how
many prisoners will seek such evidence even if they can. Moreover, Congress has proposed that prisoners who file frivolous claims should be subject to further prosecution.71 Thus, a sudden influx of claims brought into
district courts, even if it occurred, merely will incentivize Congress to enact its currently pending legislation in order to place procedural restrictions
on procurement phase claims.72
B. The Exoneration Phase
Once a prisoner is successful in the procurement phase and obtains exculpatory DNA testing results, he enters the exoneration phase, in which he
seeks release from prison based on the newly-obtained DNA evidence. In
this phase, the prisoner, in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,73 claims
that he is “actually innocent” of the charges and should be released from
prison. The concerns of protecting finality and preserving federalism that
lead the Supreme Court to reject the petitioner’s claim for exoneration in
Herrera are no longer applicable and should not prevent courts from freeing prisoners with exculpatory DNA evidence.

70. See Harvey, 278 F.3d at 379.
71. See Advancing Justice through DNA Technology Act of 2003 § 3600(f), 2003 S. 1700, 108th
Cong. (Oct. 1, 2003).
72. See Part IV infra for a discussion of the restrictions imposed by pending Congressional legislation. For a detailed argument of why Supreme Court jurisprudence compels the recognition of a due
process right to post-conviction genetic testing, see Harvey, 285 F.3d at 312-20 (Luttig, J., respecting
the denial of rehearing en banc).
73. A habeas petition is the proper remedy for state prisoners seeking a federal-court determination
that their confinement is unconstitutional. Wright, supra n. 61, at 352. The writ “is a bulwark against
convictions that violate ‘fundamental fairness,’” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982), and permits
a federal court to order the release of a state prisoner held in violation of the constitution. Wright,
supra n. 61, at 352.
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1. Herrera v. Collins
While nearly everyone agrees that an actually innocent prisoner should
be released from confinement, some remain unconvinced that DNA testing
can prove such innocence conclusively. Skeptics argue that DNA, like
fingerprints, is “negative evidence” - while its presence can establish that
someone was at a crime scene, its absence does not necessarily mean that
someone was not there.74 Thus, a prisoner in the exoneration phase should
retain the burden of demonstrating how the results of the DNA testing conclusively establish his innocence. It is clear from the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Heck and Preiser that such a result cannot be accomplished
through a § 1983 action, but there is some doubt as to what does constitute
the proper federal remedy.
In Herrera v. Collins,75 the Supreme Court expressed its reluctance to
exonerate prisoners, based on claims of actual innocence, solely because of
newly discovered evidence. The petitioner in that case, Leonel Herrera,
was convicted of capital murder.76 In an attempt to avoid his death sentence, he produced various affidavits that claimed he had not committed
the crime.77 The Court suggested that the continued incarceration of someone who could make a “truly persuasive” showing of actual innocence is
unconstitutional,78 but without explaining what evidence would suffice to
meet this standard, the Court found that Herrera’s claim fell “far short” of
it79 and suggested that he seek executive clemency instead.80 Four Justices
criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reliance on clemency to vindicate the
rights of actually innocent prisoners and proposed various standards that, if
met, would allow a prisoner claiming actual innocence access to a judicial
proceeding.81 Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected these standards and argued
that there is no guarantee, if a prisoner’s claim of actual innocence was
74. Interview by Ofra Bikel with Judge Sharon Keller, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (transcript
at Frontline, The Case for Innocence, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/interviews/
keller.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2004)); but see Christian, supra n. 37, at 1227 (“[T]he accuracy of
DNA testing demands that DNA evidence be given greater weight than fingerprint evidence.”).
75. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
76. Id. at 393.
77. Id. at 396-97.
78. Id. at 417.
79. Id. at 418-19.
80. See id. at 411.
81. Justice White would permit federal courts to hear claims of actual innocence, even after traditional remedies were exhausted, if the prisoner could show that “based on proffered newly discovered
evidence and the entire record before the jury that convicted him, ‘no rational trier of fact could [find]
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)). Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter would also
permit federal courts to consider claims of actual innocence where the petitioner demonstrates that he
“probably is innocent.” Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
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considered in a judicial hearing, that the determination of guilt or innocence would be any more accurate than at trial because the “passage of
time only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications.”82 Moreover, the Court questioned the credibility of Herrera’s affidavits because he
did not explain why he waited until the “11th hour” to produce them, they
contained inconsistencies, and, save for one, they all consisted of hearsay.83
Currently, a court’s analysis in the exoneration phase is limited by the
Supreme Court’s holding in Herrera. Arguably, the sole remedy available
is executive clemency;84 however, Herrera was decided in 1993, before
DNA testing became prevalent in courts.85 Additionally, the Court’s reasons for rejecting Herrera’s claim of actual innocence - the passage of time
and the questionable nature of affidavits - are not of concern in the exoneration phase, where the prisoner appears before the court with DNA testing results that might demonstrate conclusively that he was not the perpetrator.86 DNA results, unlike affidavits and witness testimony fashioned
years after the trial, are not subject to bias87 and thus should alleviate the
Court’s concerns regarding the integrity of the petitioner’s claim.88
The Herrera court’s reliance on executive clemency to handle claims
of actual innocence is misplaced for prisoners in the exoneration phase.
The Court explained that clemency is the “historic remedy for preventing
miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted[,]”89 and
provides the “‘fail safe’ in our criminal justice system.”90 While clemency
may be well-suited to handle individual claims of innocence based on
questionable nonscientific evidence proffered subsequent to the exhaustion

82. Id. at 403-04 (citing McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) to argue that “erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses” would lessen the chances of a reliable trial for prisoners claiming
actual innocence).
83. Id. at 417-18.
84. But see NIJ Report, supra n. 67, at 13 (suggesting that DNA evidence may suffice to make a
“truly persuasive” showing of actual innocence and thus make habeas petitions viable for prisoners).
85. Sen. 486, 107th Cong. at § 101(a)(3); H.R. 912, 107th Cong. at § 101(a)(3); see also Boemer,
supra n. 37, at 1976 (noting that post-conviction DNA testing did not “move[ ] to the forefront” until
1996); Schaffter, supra n. 37, at 699-702 (explaining the history of DNA evidence and noting that it
“was not admitted in all United States jurisdictions until 1998.”).
86. See Sen. 486, 107th Cong. at § 103(a)(1)(B); Christian, supra n. 37, at 1195; NIJ Report, supra
n. 67, at 19.
87. This statement assumes that DNA analysts’ personal biases are avoided by, for example, conducting a double-blind analysis of the evidence.
88. See Sen. 486, 107th Cong. at § 103(a)(1)(D) (“Uniquely, DNA evidence showing innocence,
produced decades after a conviction, provides a more reliable basis for establishing a correct verdict
than any evidence proffered at the original trial.”).
89. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411-12.
90. Id. at 415.
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of judicial remedies,91 it never was intended to provide widespread relief to
an entire class of persons who can demonstrate their innocence conclusively. Prisoners in the exoneration phase should not be forced to seek
executive clemency, an arduous process that generally contains its own
procedural requirements,92 because the judiciary, after considering the petitioner’s record as a whole, is better equipped to evaluate the exculpatory
nature of the evidence.93
2. Should Finality and Federalism Prevent Exoneration?
Even if Herrera is not controlling, skeptics may argue, the possibility
of exonerating prisoners will disrupt the interests of finality and federalstate comity that traditionally have limited the scope of habeas review.94
Finality is a problem that “raises acute tensions in our society.”95 It is
important because it gives legitimacy to convictions96 and allows prisoners
to begin rehabilitating once it becomes apparent that their convictions will
not be overturned.97 Without it, “criminal law is deprived of much of its
deterrent effect.”98 Skeptics of post-conviction DNA testing argue the
dangers of a slippery-slope effect - if prisoners can obtain testing whenever
a there is a technological advancement, there will never be any finality to
convictions.99 Whatever the relative importance of protecting finality, it
cannot be more necessary to the criminal justice system than the exoneration of innocent prisoners.100 Indeed, the highly exculpatory nature of

91. But see Alyson Dinsmore, Student Author, Clemency in Capital Cases: The Need to Ensure
Meaningful Review, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1825 (opining that clemency is not an effective substitute for
judicial consideration of claims of actual innocence).
92. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 415-18 (describing Texas clemency procedures).
93. See NIJ Report, supra n. 67, at xvi (recommending that the judiciary, not the governor, consider
the relevance of favorable post-conviction DNA testing).
94. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989); Engle, 456 U.S. at 126; see also Herrera, 506 U.S. at
426 (“At some point in time, the State’s interest in finality must outweigh the prisoner’s interest in yet
another round of litigation.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Harvey, 285 F.3d at 299 (“It is important
however that claims of innocence should be entertained, where possible, in the first instance by the
court, or at least by the court system, that initially heard the case.”).
95. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 441 (1963).
96. Judith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involving Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 389, 409 (2002).
97. Bator, supra n. 95, at 452.
98. Teague, 489 U.S. at 309.
99. See Harvey, 278 F.3d at 376 (“[W]e believe that finality cannot be sacrificed to every change in
technology.”); but see Harvey, 285 F.3d at 321 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc).
100. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398 (“[T]he central purpose of any system of criminal justice is to
convict the guilty and free the innocent.”); Dabbs, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 769 (“[T]o deny petitioner the
opportunity to prove his innocence with such evidence simply to ensure the finality of convictions is
untenable.”).
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DNA testing satisfies even the most conservative approaches to limit the
number of collateral attacks on criminal convictions.101
Skeptics may also argue that prisoners who hold favorable DNA testing results should nevertheless be subjected to the exhaustion requirements
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)102 before
having their claims heard in federal court.103 Among the various restrictions AEDPA places on habeas petitions,104 § 2244(b)(2) requires dismissal
of a second or successive habeas petition if the claim had not been presented previously unless the prisoner can demonstrate that: (1) the factual
predicate of the claim could not have been discovered previously through
reasonable diligence, and (2) the claim, if proven, would be sufficient to
establish by “clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional
error,” no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty.105 Moreover, AEDPA requires that a prisoner obtain an order from the appropriate
court of appeals to direct a district court to entertain the claim.106
AEDPA should not stand in the way of the exoneration of innocent
prisoners. AEDPA was enacted to further the interests of finality, comity,
and federalism;107 however, these concerns are not offended where a prisoner possesses exculpatory DNA testing results and seeks immediate release from prison. Moreover, legislation currently pending in Congress
expresses an apparent interest in excluding claims based on postconviction DNA testing from AEDPA’s requirements.108 While provisions
101. See generally Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). Judge Friendly sought to limit the number of habeas petitions
filed by prisoners by requiring such claims to be supplemented with “a colorable claim of innocence.”
Id. at 142. One acceptable manner for the prisoner to achieve this is by showing “a fair probability
that, in light of all the evidence, including . . . evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded
or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt.” Id. at 160.
102. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
103. The Ninth Circuit recently confronted this very issue in Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077 (2003),
and concluded that AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement applies to claims of actual innocence based on
newly discovered evidence. The court explained that the limitations period on these claims “begins to
run when the prisoner could have discovered the new evidence through the exercise of due diligence.”
Id. at 1083. Under AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement, however, the prisoner’s federal habeas claim
cannot be filed until state court remedies have been exhausted. Id. Accordingly, the federal limitations
period is tolled while the state claim is pending. Id.
104. See Howard P. Fink, et al., Federal Courts In The 21st Century, 1022 (2d ed., LexisNexis 2002).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000) (emphasis added). A prisoner may also escape dismissal if
he can demonstrate that his claim “relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable[.]” 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(2)(A) (2000).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2000).
107. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000).
108. See Sen. 1700, 108th Cong. at § 3600(h)(3) (explaining that a motion for post-conviction DNA
testing shall not be considered a habeas petition for purposes of considering whether the motion should
be barred by AEDPA).
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of pending legislation are by no means binding on federal courts, they do
provide guidance in handling novel issues that Congress has considered.
Current legislative efforts, coupled with the realization that no interest is
served by precluding the exoneration of an innocent prisoner, should provide federal courts with a reasonable basis for departure from AEDPA’s
restraints.
Even if AEDPA’s strict requirements are not imposed on prisoners in
the exoneration phase, exhaustion of state remedies should not be disregarded completely. The Supreme Court has touted on numerous occasions
the importance of exhaustion in respecting federalism.109 Indeed, long
before the passage of AEDPA, the Court declared that, in the interest of
comity, federal courts should not entertain habeas petitions until the state
courts have had an opportunity to resolve the matter.110 This idea, that
federal courts should avoid interfering with the legitimate activities of the
states, has existed since the early days of America.111 It “occupies a highly
important place in our Nation's history and its future.”112
Typically, exhaustion is required only where the state remedy is adequate and available.113 For prisoners in the exoneration phase, state relief
may or may not be available, depending on the particular state’s postconviction legislation.114 Thus, if the state does not have a post-conviction
DNA testing statute, or if the prisoner would be procedurally barred from
asserting a right under an applicable state statute, the prisoner should be
able to file his habeas petition in federal court without first seeking state
redress, since any such attempt would be futile. On the other hand, if the
state has an adequate115 post-conviction DNA statute or procedure pursuant
to which the prisoner is able to bring a claim, then it is reasonable to require that such remedies be exhausted before suit is filed in federal
court.116

109. See e.g. Younger, 401 U.S. at 37 (1971). In Younger, the Court explained that the notion of
“Our Federalism” represents the idea that “the National Government will fare best if the States and
their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.”). Id. at 44.
110. Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); see also Preiser, 411 U.S. at 491 (“The rule of exhaustion
in federal habeas corpus actions is rooted in considerations of federal-state comity.”); Darr v. Burford,
339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950) (“[I]t would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal
district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a
constitutional violation.”); Chemerinsky, supra n. 3, at 800-01.
111. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45.
112. Id.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
114. See supra Part III & n. 36.
115. There is some debate as to what remedy is “adequate” where a prisoner holds favorable DNA
test results; however, anything less than a right to a new trial should not be considered adequate.
116. Indeed, pending federal legislation requires state prisoners to exhaust available state remedies
before seeking redress in federal court. Sen. 1700, 108th Cong. at § 3600(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II).
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IV. THE ADVANCING JUSTICE THROUGH DNA TECHNOLOGY ACT: A
STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
The Advancing Justice through DNA Technology Act of 2003 (the
“Act”),117 which currently is pending in both branches of Congress, provides certain post-conviction DNA testing rights to prisoners,118 but falls
short of recognizing prisoners’ due process rights to the evidence.
A. Claims Made in the Procurement Phase
Pursuant to the Act, prisoners who are incarcerated for a state offense
may make a motion for post-conviction DNA in federal court only if: (1)
there is no adequate state remedy; or (2) the prisoner can demonstrate that
he has exhausted available state remedies.119 Recall that § 1983, the traditional vehicle for redress in federal court by state prisoners, does not have
an exhaustion requirement.120 It thus appears that the Act intends to modify § 1983 by requiring exhaustion in the post-conviction DNA testing
context; however, the Act never specifically states this intent. Indeed, in
an apparent attempt to avoid the very confusion that it creates, the Act
makes clear that it shall not “affect the circumstances under which a person
may obtain DNA testing or post-conviction relief under any other law.”121
This legislation would allow a prisoner to bring a civil action to assert
his right to post-conviction DNA testing, but it is unclear whether such a
suit could be brought under § 1983. The Supreme Court has explained that
Congress may preclude the availability of § 1983 suits to vindicate federal
rights by including a “sufficiently comprehensive” remedial scheme in an
Act;122 the scheme’s existence evidences Congress’ intent to prohibit otherwise cognizable §1983 claims.123
As written currently, it is unclear whether Congress intends for the
Act’s remedial scheme to foreclose § 1983 actions to prisoners who are
denied post-conviction DNA testing. The Act simultaneously adds an exhaustion requirement to claims made in the procurement phase and states
117. For a discussion of Congress’ ability to enact the Advancing Justice through DNA Technology
Act, see Larry Yackle, Congressional Power to Require DNA Testing, 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 1173 (2001).
118. The Act also provides relief for federal prisoners, but analysis of those provisions is outside the
scope of this Comment.
119. Sen. 1700, 108th Cong. at § 3600(a)(1)(B)(ii).
120. See Part IIIA.
121. Sen. 1700, 108th Cong. at § 3600(h)(1).
122. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Natl. Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981).
123. Id. at 21. Justice Stevens, writing separately, suggests that Congressional intent should not be
assumed by the mere existence of a comprehensive remedial scheme; rather, the burden should be on
the defendant to identify express language demonstrating Congress’ intent to foreclose § 1983 actions.
Id. at 28 & n. 11 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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that other laws shall remain unaffected. Unless revised, this ambiguity will
lead to confusion and further delays in the exoneration of innocent prisoners.
B. Claims Made in the Exoneration Phase
Under the Act, a prisoner who receives exculpatory DNA testing results may file a motion for a new trial or resentencing. This motion shall
be granted if the court finds that “the DNA test results, when considered
with all other evidence in the case (regardless of whether such evidence
was introduced at trial), establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a
new trial would result in an acquittal . . . .”124 The Act precludes an endrun around its requirements by stating that “[n]othing in [the Act] shall
provide a basis for relief in any [f]ederal habeas corpus proceeding.”125
The consequence of the Act is that prisoners in the exoneration phase
who possess exculpatory DNA test results may receive a new trial if the
judge concludes after considering all of the evidence - even evidence that
was not introduced at trial - that an acquittal is likely. This remedy is a far
cry from the exoneration and release from confinement currently available
to prisoners through a successful writ of habeas corpus or executive clemency. Thus, while the Act is a step in the right direction, in many ways it
lessens innocent prisoners’ available remedies.126
V. CONCLUSION
The current split among the circuits as to what rights prisoners have to
post-conviction DNA testing must be resolved. Congress ultimately will
determine the proper approach to handling such claims; however, given the
current political climate, legislation may take years to enact. In the meantime, the Supreme Court should recognize that DNA testing can rectify the
inherent errors of our fallible justice system.127 In so doing, it is imperative
that a bifurcated approach be employed whereby a due process right to
DNA testing is recognized in the procurement phase and judicial review of
favorable testing results is mandated in the exoneration phase.

124. S. 1700, 108th Cong. at § 3600(g)(2).
125. Id. at § 3600(h)(2).
126. There is no need to elaborate further on the proper judicial interpretation of this statute because
it is still pending and subject to revision.
127. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 415 (“It is an unalterable fact that our judicial system, like the human
beings who administer it, is fallible.”).
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Moreover, pre-existing procedural restrictions, such as the Prison Litigation Reform Act and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act, which are meant to keep frivolous claims out of court, should not be
permitted to preclude meritorious claims of innocence based on DNA testing. Only when these rights are bestowed upon prisoners and the innocently incarcerated are allowed to regain their freedom can the criminal
justice system be considered just.

